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THE RENTON DECISION: A NEW




In City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.1 the Supreme Court up-
held a local zoning ordinance that limited the location of theaters ex-
hibiting adult movies2 in Renton, Washington3 to a 520 acre area in
one comer of the city. Municipal restrictions on "adult businesses" 4
raise serious constitutional issues because the first amendment guaran-
tee of freedom of speech5 extends to sexually-oriented media as long as
* Associate Professor, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, Touro College.
1. 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986).
2. In April 1981 the City of Renton enacted Ordinance Number 3526, which re-
stricted the location of any "adult motion picture theater." The ordinance defined an
"adult motion picture theater" as
an enclosed building used for presenting motion picture films, video cassettes, cable
television, or any other such visual media, distinguished or characterized by an
emphasis on matter depicting, describing or related to "specified sexual activities"
or "specified anatomical areas" as hereafter defined, for observation by patrons
therein.
Playtime Theaters, Inc. v. City of Renton, 748 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1984).
3. Renton is a suburban community of approximately 32,000 people bordering Seat-
tle to the south. 106 S. Ct. at 927.
4. The terms "adult businesses" or "adult entertainment businesses" typically refer
to theaters, bookstores, mini-theaters, bars, and cabarets that purvey entertainment or
merchandise characterized by an emphasis on nudity and sex.
See generally F. STROM, ZONING CONTROL OF SEX BUSINESSES (1977); P. ROHAN,
ZONING & LAND USE CONTROLS § 11.01[2] (1986).
5. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
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the material is merely pornographic and not considered obscene.6 This
article traces the development of the case law governing zoning regula-
tion of adult businesses and critically examines the Renton decision in
the light of those cases.
BACKGROUND
Only a decade before the Renton decision, the Supreme Court, in
Young v. American Mini-Theatres,7 first decided a case "in which the
interests in free expression protected by the first and fourteenth amend-
ments have been implicated by a municipality's commercial zoning or-
dinance."8 Young, like Renton, considered the constitutionality of
zoning restrictions applied to adult businesses. At issue was the legal-
ity of amendments to Detroit's "Anti-Skid Row" ordinance that sin-
gled-out adult bookstores and theaters for special zoning treatment.9
The Detroit zoning amendments added adult motion picture thea-
ters and adult bookstores to a list of businesses that, absent special ap-
proval, could not be located within 1,000 feet of any two other
similarly regulated uses.10 The amendment also prohibited adult book-
stores and theaters from locating within 500 feet of a residential dwell-
ing.11 The original "Anti-Skid Row" ordinance, adopted in 1962, was
based on findings by the Detroit Common Council that concentrations
of certain types of businesses can have a blighting effect on the sur-
press.. . ." The first amendment is made applicable to the states by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229
(1963).
6. The first amendment does not protect obscene material. See Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Non-obscene pornogra-
phy, however, is entitled to protection under the first amendment. See Young v. Ameri-
can Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976). The Supreme Court in Miller set forth a test for
determining whether pornography is obscene. The Court found material obscene if the
average person would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to a "prurient inter-
est in sex," portrays sex in a "patently offensive" manner, and "lacks serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value." 413 U.S. at 24.
7. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
8. Id. at 76 (Powell, J., concurring).
9. Id. at 54-55.
10. Detroit, Mich., Ordinance 742-G (Nov. 2, 1972) (amending DETROIT, MICH.,
OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE §§ 32.007, 66.0000, 66.0101 (1962)).
11. Detroit, Mich., Ordinance 743-G (Nov. 2, 1972). Following enactment of these
amendments, "regulated uses" included adult bookstores, adult theaters and mini-thea-
ters, bars, cabarets, hotels and motels, pawnshops, pool and billiard halls, public lodg-
ing houses, secondhand stores, shoeshine parlors, and taxi dance halls.
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rounding neighborhood.2 The council's 1972 addition of adult thea-
ters and bookstores to the list of "regulated uses" was made in response
to the rapid increase in the number of these businesses in the previous
five years. 13 Supporters of the amendments, including urban planners
and real estate experts, claimed that "the location of several such busi-
nesses in the same neighborhood tends to attract an undesirable quan-
tity and quality of transients, adversely affects property values, causes
an increase in crime, especially prostitution, and encourages residents
and businesses to move elsewhere."' 4
The Supreme Court upheld the ordinance, but could not agree on a
majority opinion for doing so. 5 Justice Stevens wrote for a majority in
the first two parts of his opinion, in which he rejected claims that the
amendments were void for vagueness 16 and invalid as prior restraints
12. Section 66.0000 of the Official Zoning Ordinance stated:
In the development and execution of this Ordinance, it is recognized that there
are some uses which, because of their very nature, are recognized as having serious
objectionable operational characteristics, particularly when several of them are
concentrated under certain circumstances, thereby having a deleterious effect upon
the adjacent areas. Special regulation of these uses is necessary to insure that these
adverse effects will not contribute to the blighting or downgrading of the surround-
ing neighborhood. These special regulations are itemized in this section. The pri-
mary control or regulation is for the purpose of preventing a concentration of these
usees in any one area (i.e. not more than two such uses within one thousand feet of
each other which would create such adverse effects).
DETROIT, MICH., OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE § 66.0000 (1962).
13. Police statistics indicate that between 1967 and 1972 the number of adult thea-
ters had increased from two to twenty-five, and a comparable increase occurred in the
number of adult bookstores and other adult businesses. Young, 427 U.S. at 55 n.8.
14. Id. at 55.
15. The Court split 4-1-4. Justice Stevens' opinion, joined by Justices Burger,
White, Powell, and Rehnquist, upheld the ordinance but Justice Powell rejected the part
of Stevens' opinion that dealt with the issue of how courts should review zoning regula-
tions that distinguish among businesses based on the content of speech. Justice Stevens
wrote a separate concurring opinion on that point. Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall,
and Blackmun dissented. 427 U.S. at 50.
16. The alleged vagueness of the amendments did not affect the parties before the
Court because the ordinance unquestionably applied to them. The respondents argued,
however, that they could raise the vagueness issue because the Court had ruled on sev-
eral occasions that a litigant could assert the rights of third parties in first amendment
cases. These rulings reasoned that an ordinance affecting speech could cause parties not
before the Court to refrain from exercising their right to free expression.
Justice Stevens noted that while the overriding importance of the first amendment
justifies such an exception to traditional standing rules, the Court will make an excep-
tion only if the statute's deterrent effect on legitimate expression is "real and substan-
tial" and the statute is not "readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state
courts." Finding that the litigants could meet neither of these requirements, Justice
1987]
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on free speech. 7 Justice Stevens, however, lost Justice Powell in the
third part of his opinion, which held that on equal protection grounds,
adult theaters could be treated differently under first amendment prin-
ciples from other types of protected speech. Stevens argued that many
instances exist in which courts examine the content of speech to deter-
mine if it should be protected 18 or, if the speech is unarguably pro-
tected, whether a different governmental response, based on content, is
required.19 Having argued that government may appraise the content
of speech to determine the degree of first amendment protection to be
afforded, Justice Stevens justified Detroit's differing treatment of adult
and non-adult films by placing pornography on a lower constitutional
Stevens rejected their claims. 427 U.S. at 60 (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975)).
Justice Blackmun's dissent was sharply critical of Stevens' view of the vagueness
claim. Justice Blackmun argued that the amendment's definition of what made a book-
store or theater "adult" was impermissibly vague. The "adult" classification depended
on whether the bookstore or theater presented material "'distinguished or character-
ized by an emphasis on' certain specified activities, including sexual intercourse or speci-
fied anatomical areas." 427 U.S. at 89. Blackmun contended that a movie exhibitor
would find no help in such a definition when he showed films: "It will be simple enough,
as the operator screens films, to tell when one of these areas or activities is being de-
picted, but if the depiction represents only a part of the films' subject matter, I am at a
loss to know how he will tell whether they 'are distinguished or characterized by an
emphasis' on those areas and activities. The ordinance gives him no guidance .. " Id.
17. In what the author finds the most persuasive portion of Stevens' opinion, the
Justice argues that Detroit's restrictions on adult theaters do not impose a limit on the
number of theaters, but merely restrict their location: "There is no claim that distribu-
tors or exhibitors of adult films are denied access to the market or, conversely, that the
viewing public is unable to satisfy its appetite for sexually explicit fare. Viewed as an
entity, the market for this commodity is essentially unrestrained." Id.
18. Id. at 66. Justice Stevens cited as one example the content-based distinction
between an epithet (protected) and "fighting words" (unprotected).
19. Id. at 66-70. Stevens' examples in this category include the limitations placed
on the state's power to enforce their libel laws, see New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964) (constitutional protections for speech and press limit state powers to
award damages in libel actions brought by public officials against critics of official con-
duct) and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (standard of libel recovery
for private individuals is a matter for the states to determine as long as they do not
impose liability without fault); the differing measure of protection afforded to commer-
cial speech, see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748 (1976) (state may regulate commercial speech in ways that would be im-
permissible if applied to ideological communication); and differing treatment of the sale
of sexually oriented materials to minors, see Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)
(statute making sale of magazine to minor criminal offense although magazine would
not be obscene if shown to adults).
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level than other forms of expression.2 °
Justice Stevens concluded his opinion by questioning whether the
interest that Detroit asserted in neighborhood preservation justified the
limitations placed on protected speech. For Stevens, this inquiry was
answered satisfactorily by the fact that the record below disclosed a
factual basis for Detroit's conclusion that the amendments would have
the desired effect. Finally, Stevens reiterated that the ordinance would
not have the effect of suppressing or greatly restricting access to lawful
speech, and noted that "the situation would be quite different" if it
did.21
The Stevens opinion stated three critical components for judicial re-
view of ordinances that regulate adult businesses. First, the ordinance
must have as its objective the control of the "secondary effects" of
adult businesses, urban decay in Detroit's case, rather than protecting
citizens from exposure to the content of the speech itself.22 Second, the
ordinance must not have the effect of "suppressing, or greatly restrict-
ing access to" adult businesses,23 but must leave the market for this
commodity "essentially unrestrained."24 Third, the municipality must
provide a factual basis for its regulatory scheme.25 If an ordinance
meets these tests, Stevens calls for the reviewing court to defer to the
judgment of the municipality and uphold the ordinance.
The dissenting Justices viewed Stevens' opinion as a "drastic depar-
20. Justice Stevens wrote:
[I]t is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a
wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political
debate that inspired Voltaire's immortal comment. Whether political oratory or
philosophical discussion moves us to applaud or to despise what is said, every
schoolchild can understand why our duty to defend the right to speak remains the
same. But few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the
citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theaters of our
choice. Even though the first amendment protects communication in this area
from total suppression, we hold that the State may legitimately use the content of
these materials as the basis for placing them in a different classification from other
motion pictures.
427 U.S. at 70-71. "Voltaire's immortal comment" refers to a quote from Voltaire that
appeared earlier in Stevens' opinion: "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to
the death your right to say it." 427 U.S. at 63 (footnote omitted).
21. Id. at 71-72 n.35. See supra note 17.
22. 427 U.S. at 71 n.34.
23. Id. at 71 n.35.
24. Id. at 62.
25. Id. at 71.
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ture from established principles of first amendment law."2 6 They saw
the ordinance as a forbidden content-based restriction on freedom of
expression. 27 Justice Powell's concurring opinion, while disagreeing
with Stevens' justification for treating pornography differently from
other forms of protected speech, found the Detroit scheme acceptable
on constitutional grounds. Powell saw the dispersal of adult businesses
as "innovative land-use regulation, implicating First Amendment con-
cerns only incidentally and to a limited extent.",21 In Powell's view,
Detroit had broad regulatory authority to deal with neighborhood
blight through its zoning laws. What distinguished the case, however,
is that it presented to the Court the novel question of potential conflict
between the first amendment and land-use regulation.
Justice Powell found that the impact of the ordinance on freedom of
expression was merely incidental to the goal of the regulation because
the Detroit scheme did not impose any content limitation on the cre-
ators of adult movies and did not restrict exhibition of the movies in
any significant way.29 In these circumstances, Powell argued, the ap-
26. Id. at 84.
27. As has been noted, Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion focused on the vague-
ness issue. See supra note 16. Justice Stewart directly countered Stevens' contention
that pornography was not entitled to the fullest protection of the first amendment. In-
voking the philosophical underpinnings of the first amendment, Stewart attacked Ste-
vens for denigrating the constitutional status of pornography just because most people
may not consider the right to sell and read pornography to be as important as other
constitutional rights. Justice Stewart stated:
[I]f the guarantees of the First Amendment were reserved for expression that
more than a 'few of us' would take up arms to defend, then the right of free expres-
sion would be defined and circumscribed by current popular opinion. The guaran-
tees of the Bill of Rights were designed to protect against precisely such
majoritarian limitations on individual liberty....
The fact that the 'offensive' speech here may not address 'important topics'-
ideas of social and political significance in the Court's terminology, .. .-- does not
mean that it is less worthy of constitutional protection.
427 U.S. at 86-87 (footnotes omitted).
28. Id. at 73. Powell traced the evolution of zoning from the early efforts at com-
prehensive land-use regulation in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)
(municipality divided into residential, commercial and industrial zones), to the complex
and innovative forms necessary to deal with the problems of modern urban life in Vil-
lage of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (zoning regulation restricting land use to
single-family dwellings and defining "family" so that no more than two unrelated per-
sons could reside in a single dwelling upheld on ground that desire to avoid congestion
and noise from both people and vehicles were legitimate goals in a community devoted
to family values).
29. 427 U.S. at 78-79.
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propriate test for analyzing the Detroit zoning is the four-part test of
United States v. O'Brien.30 Under O'Brien a governmental regulation is
sufficiently justified, despite its incidental impact upon first amendment
interests, "if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if
it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and if the incidental restriction on... First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."3 1 Apply-
ing this test to the Detroit ordinance, Powell found that Detroit had
the power to enact zoning regulations; that the interest in neighbor-
hood preservation was substantial; that no indication existed that De-
troit was engaging in any effort to suppress free expression; and that
the degree of incidental encroachment on freedom of expression was
the minimum necessary to achieve the city's purpose.3 2
DEVELOPMENTS AFTER YOUNG
In the wake of the Young decision, a number of municipalities
adopted the Detroit dispersion technique to address the problems they
claimed resulted from the negative effects adult businesses have on
neighborhoods.3 3 While many of these ordinances were validated,34
30. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
31. Id. at 377.
32. 427 U.S. at 80-82.
33. See Note, Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1427, 1557
(1978).
34. Courts have generally upheld ordinances that include substantially the same
locational restrictions as the Detroit ordinance in Young. Courts, however, have often
invalidated additional restrictions on adult businesses such as licensing or special-permit
requirements. See, e.g., Grand Faloon Tavern, Inc. v. Wicker, 670 F.2d 943 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982); 15192 Thirteen Mile Road v. City of Warren, 593 F.
Supp. 147 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (locational restrictions upheld but special permit require-
ment invalid); Genusa v. City of Peoria, 475 F. Supp. 1199 (C.D. Ill. 1979) (zoning
upheld, but licensing provisions invalid), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and vacated in part,
619 F.2d 1203 (7th Cir. 1980); Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. Carson, 470 F. Supp. 1140
(M.D. Fla. 1979) (locational restrictions upheld, but licensing restrictions invalid); Wal-
nut Properties, Inc. v. Ussery, 178 Cal. App. 2d 173, 223 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1986); City of
Whittier v. Walnut Properties, Inc., 149 Cal. App. 3d 633, 197 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1983);
Strand Property Corp. v. Municipal Court, 148 Cal. App. 3d 882, 200 Cal. Rptr. 47
(1983); Castner v. City of Oakland, 129 Cal. App. 3d 94, 180 Cal. App. 3d 369, 181 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1982) (zoning requirements upheld); Pringle v. City of Covina, 115 Cal. App.
3d 151, 171 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1981); City of Chicago v. Scandia Books, Inc., 102 Ill. App.
3d 292, 430 N.E.2d 14 (1981); Texas Nat'l Theatres, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 97
N.M. 282, 639 P.2d 569 (1982); Kacar, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 432 A.2d 310 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1981).
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court challenges to several dispersion schemes revealed that some cities
had disregarded the guidelines provided by Young and enacted ordi-
nances that failed one or more of the tests set out in the Powell and
Stevens opinions.35 Thus, courts struck down adult business ordi-
nances because of vagueness, 36 a lack of legislative findings supporting
the restrictions,37 or because the enactment had the effect of banning or
severely restricting access to adult entertainment.38
The courts commonly found that an adult business ordinance suf-
fered from a multitude of sins. The Atlanta, Georgia effort to restrict
adult businesses provides a good example of the abuses courts often
found. Atlanta's ordinance, patterned on the Detroit scheme, was en-
acted in November 1976, five months after the Supreme Court decided
Young.39 Section 1 of the ordinance set out the findings of fact and
35. Because no majority upheld the Detroit ordinance without Justice Powell's vote,
most courts reviewed adult business ordinances under both the Stevens and Powell
opinions or under Powell's O'Brien test alone on the theory that, as the more demand-
ing standard, it included Stevens' requirements. See infra notes 36-38.
Some courts have been critical of Stevens' approach. See International Food & Bev-
erage Sys. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 614 F. Supp. 1517, 1519 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (Stevens
approach is an "aberration in First Amendment jurisprudence, for his analysis would
have the courts judge the societal worth of each class of expression."). Other courts
have relied solely on the Stevens opinion. See Walnut Properties, Inc. v. Ussery, 178
Cal. App. 3d 173, 223 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1986); North Street Book Shoppe, Inc. v. Village
of Endicott, 582 F. Supp. 1428 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
36. See, e.g., Harris Books, Inc. v. City of Santa Fe, 98 N.M. 235, 647 P.2d 868
(1982) (term "residential area" impermissibly vague); Entertainment Concepts, Inc. v.
Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1980) (ordinance subjecting "adult" movies to spe-
cial permit requirement void for vagueness when the term "adult" is not defined).
37. See, e.g., North Street Book Shoppe, Inc. v. Village of Endicott, 582 F. Supp.
1428 (N.D.N.Y. 1984); CLR Corp. v. Henline, 520 F. Supp. 760 (W.D. Mich. 1981)
(city failed to provide any legislative history or factual background for ordinance, claim-
ing it could rely on the experience of Detroit and other cities), aff'd, 702 F.2d 637 (6th
Cir. 1983); Ellwest Stereo Theaters, Inc. v. Byrd, 472 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Tex. 1979);
but see Genusa v. City of Peoria, 475 F. Supp. 1199 (C.D. Ill. 1979) (legislative body is
entitled to rely on the experience and findings of other legislative bodies as a basis for
action), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and vacated in part, 619 F.2d 1203 (7th Cir. 1980).
38. See, e.g., Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 698 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1983) (ordi-
nance reduced permissible locations for adult businesses by two-thirds); Basiardanes v.
City of Galveston, 513 F. Supp. 975 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (ordinance banned adult uses
from most of the city, and areas where allowed were unsuited for such use), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 682 F.2d 1203 (8th Cir. 1983); Keego Harbor Co. v.
City of Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1981) (ordinance left no location available
for adult use); Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson, 511 F. Supp. 1207 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (ordi-
nance that restricted adult uses to only three zoning districts would reduce access to
adult entertainment).
39. Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson, 511 F. Supp. 1207, 1209 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
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statements of purpose in language quite similar to Detroit's ordinance.
The Atlanta city council deemed it necessary that adult businesses "be
subject to special regulations in order to insure that such uses and the
effects thereof will not contribute to the blighting of or the downgrad-
ing of the surrounding neighborhood."'
The "special regulations" were embodied in a dispersion scheme that
used locational restrictions significantly more stringent than Detroit's.
Not only were the distance requirements stiffened, but all new adult
businesses were restricted to three zoning districts. Certain existing
businesses would either become non-conforming uses4 or have to cease
operation.4 2 These restrictions were significant departures from the
Detroit ordinance, which had not limited the zoning districts in which
adult businesses could operate and had applied only to new adult
businesses.
At trial, the district court was concerned whether the additional lo-
cational restrictions of the ordinance were so severe that they would
significantly reduce, and possibly eliminate altogether, public access to
sexually oriented businesses. The city, while contending that it was not
required to assure a sufficient number of sites for adult businesses in the
three permitted zoning districts, claimed that at least eighty-one sites
existed that would be suitable for adult businesses. On the basis of a
careful review of the evidence, the court found that all but ten of these
sites were wholly unacceptable as sites for adult businesses. Of those
ten acceptable sites, no more than three or four would be considered by
a reasonably prudent investor as a possible site for an adult business.43
40. Id. at 1210.
41. A non-conforming use is a use of land or a building that does not comply with
the terms of a zoning ordinance. Non-conforming uses are normally subject to restric-
tions on enlargement, change of use, and rebuilding in the event of destruction of the
premises. See D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 130-37 (1982).
42. 511 F. Supp. at 1211-13. The ordinance prohibited any adult bookstore, thea-
ter, or "entertainment establishment" from locating within 1,000 feet of any one other
such use, or within 500 feet of the boundaries of any residential district or property used
for residential purposes, or within 500 feet of any permanent structure used as a church
or place of religious worship. The ordinance restricted new adult businesses to three
zoning districts: the C-4 central business district in the heart of the city and two indus-
trial districts-M-1 and M-2-ocated some distance from the central business district.
Existing adult bookstores and theaters not in these three districts became non-con-
forming uses, and adult entertainment establishments (generally nightclubs) located
outside the three districts were subject to amortization provisions that required them to
cease operations within four years or less.
43. Id. at 1216-17. The court did not consider either the price of the land or
whether the land was presently for sale. Although the court did not examine each of
1987]
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At the time of trial, forty-two or forty-three sexually oriented busi-
nesses existed in Atlanta, twelve or thirteen of which offered live en-
tertainment. The amortization provision would effect all but one of the
establishments offering live entertainment. These establishments,
therefore, would have to relocate. The adult businesses outside the
three zones in which the ordinance permitted new uses would become
non-conforming uses under the ordinance and, therefore, faced a ban
on enlarging, extending, or reconstructing their businesses. In the
court's view, this would have the effect of slowly reducing the number
of adult businesses outside the permitted districts. Because nearly all
the adult entertainment businesses would have to relocate within four
years, as would any existing non-conforming adult business that
wanted to enlarge, and because these relocating businesses would have
to compete with any new businesses for no more than ten sites, the
court concluded that the ordinance would reduce public access in At-
lanta to both live entertainment and books and movies characterized
by an emphasis on sex.'
Although the court's finding of restricted access was, by itself, suffi-
cient to invalidate the ordinance, the Atlanta scheme suffered from
other faults. The court found that the ordinance used definitions of
"adult bookstores" and "adult theaters" that were substantially over-
broad45 and found strong evidence of an improper motive in enacting
the eighty-one sites, by reviewing the maps, documentary evidence, photographs, and
testimony regarding site availability the court was able to find only ten acceptable sites.
A few of the claimed eighty-one sites were unavailable simply because they violated the
ordinance's locational criteria. Many other sites were wholly unsuited for retail or com-
mercial use because the lots were too small or oddly-shaped to allow construction of a
building of suitable size. Several sites were twenty to thirty feet below street level, mak-
ing commercial use impossible. One site was in a floodplain and another was bisected
by an easement for electric transmission wires. A number of other sites were unsuitable
due to nearby noxious uses including, in one case, the Atlanta sewage treatment plant.
Going further, the court found that a large number of sites were simply unavailable
and would remain so for the foreseeable future. Some sites were occupied by buildings
housing substantial businesses or were in use as employee parking lots for successful
manufacturing plants. In a number of cases, the ownership of potential sites made their
sale to the operator of an adult business highly unlikely. For example, one landowner
was the City of Atlanta, while another was the Southern Railway.
44. This forced relocation would clearly violate both the Stevens and Powell opin-
ions in Young. See Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.35, 84 (1976).
45. 511 F. Supp. at 1219-23. The definition of an "adult bookstore" was so broad
that it would include any building, including the federal courthouse, in which a copy of
Playboy or a similar publication might be found. Similarly, the definition of an "adult
theater" easily encompassed major downtown hotels, such as the Hyatt and Marriott,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol32/iss1/4
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the ordinance.4 6 While sympathetic with the stated aims of the city in
passing the ordinance, the court found that the ordinance could not
pass muster on constitutional grounds.
Five years after Young the Supreme Court again considered a zoning
restriction on adult entertainment in Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim.' The Mount Ephraim ordinance achieved its goal of ban-
ning nude dancing by prohibiting all live entertainment in the borough,
a suburban New Jersey community. The ban included live entertain-
ment that did not deal with sex or nudity.4 8 A sharply divided Court4 9
held that the ordinance, by banning all live entertainment, was invalid
because it intruded too far on rights protected by the first amendment.
Justice White's majority opinion set out a two-part test to determine
whether a zoning ordinance infringes on first amendment rights: the
ordinance must be narrowly drawn and must further a sufficiently sub-
stantial government interest.5" Further, he found that Young did not
control this case because the restriction on all live entertainment went
well beyond the minimal burden on protected speech that Young ad-
dressed.5 1 Finding that the borough could not adequately justify its
substantial restriction of protected activity, Justice White found the or-
dinance unconstitutional.
52
Two interesting aspects of the Schad case introduced issues not con-
that made films emphasizing sexual activity or nudity available in guest rooms on cable
television.
46. Id. at 1210. The minutes of a zoning review board meeting revealed that, in
addition to the ordinance's stated purposes, the ordinance as designed "would help
those citizens disgusted by the conduct of these businesses to zone them out of busi-
ness." Id. At that same meeting, an assistant city attorney indicated that the adult
zoning ordinance was the "strongest vehicle toward elimination" of adult businesses
and the city was "hoping for complete eradication" of adult businesses. Id. The city
attorney also stated that the effect of the ordinance would be to reduce the number of
these establishments. Id. (citations omitted).
47. 452 U.S. 61.
48. Id. at 66.
49. Justice White wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart,
Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell. Justice Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion as did
Justice Powell, with whom Justice Stewart joined. Justice Stevens filed an opinion con-
curring in the judgment. Chief Justice Burger dissented, joined by Justice Rehnquist.
50. 452 U.S. at 68.
51. Id. at 71. Because the Mount Ephraim ordinance banned all live entertainment
in the borough, the issue of content-based regulation, so critical in Young, was not rele-
vant here.
52. Id. at 72-76.
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sidered in the Young decision. First, Mount Empraim argued that it
need not allow live entertainment, and nude dancing in particular,
within its boundaries if such adult entertainment is readily available in
nearby communities. The Court rejected this position, finding that the
right to freedom of expression in any one locale may not be abridged by
an ordinance that asserts as its justification that the right to expression
may be exercised in some other place. 3 Second, Mount Ephraim also
suggested that its ordinance was a reasonable "time, place, and man-
ner" restriction.54 The Court also rejected this claim on the grounds
that the borough could offer no legitimate governmental interest for the
restriction and did not leave open adequate alternative channels of
communication.
Lower courts, which had not been hesitant before Schad to invali-
date overly restrictive adult zoning schemes,56 now could also look to
this most recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court to support their
decisions. Over the next few years, the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal struck down overly restrictive adult
zoning regulations, justifying their decisions, in part, on Schad.57
Considering the decisions of the Supreme Court in Young and Schad
along with the rulings of other federal and state courts, one would con-
clude that zoning cases involving restrictions on adult businesses such
as theaters and bookstores with first amendment protection showed a
clear pattern of judicial concern with maintaining community access to
such businesses. Four rules appeared to guide the courts' decisions:
(1) locational restrictions on adult businesses would be upheld only if
the market for this commodity was essentially unrestrained;
(2) vaguely worded ordinances were unacceptable; (3) ordinances that
did not develop a factual basis for their restrictions or that did not
relate those restrictions directly to recognized zoning purposes would
be struck down; and (4) ordinances that granted government officials
53. Id. at 76-77.
54. Id. at 74-75. The state may place reasonable time, place, and manner restric-
tions on speech as long as it does not endeavor to restrict the content of speech itself
under the guise of regulating how, when, and where the speech occurs. See, e.g.,
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1971).
55. 452 U.S. at 75-76.
56. See supra notes 36-38.
57. See Krueger v. City of Pensacola, 759 F.2d 851 (11th Cir. 1985); Playtime The-
aters v. City of Renton, 748 F.2d. 527 (9th Cir. 1984); CLR Corp. v. Henline, 702 F.2d
637 (6th Cir. 1983); Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 698 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1983);
Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1982).
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overbroad discretionary powers to determine whether or not an adult
business would be permitted to operate would be struck down.
The Supreme Court's decision in City of Renton v. Playtime Thea-
tres, Inc.58 made significant changes in two of these rules, allowing lo-
cal governments more freedom to regulate adult businesses. Renton is
silent on the other rules, however, and the ultimate effect of the case
depends in large part on how lower courts apply the new rulings to
specific cases. The remainder of this article discusses the Renton case
and explores the implications it holds for adult business zoning in light
of other recent state and federal court decisions.
THE RENTON DECISION
The controversy that gave rise to the Renton case began in May 1980
when the mayor of Renton, a Seattle suburb of 32,000 people, re-
quested that the City Council consider enacting adult business legisla-
tion. At the time, no adult businesses were located in the city. The
City Council referred the matter to the city's Planning and Develop-
ment Committee, which held public hearings, reviewed the experience
of Seattle and other cities, and sought the advice of the City Attorney.
The City Council also enacted a moratorium on the licensing of adult
businesses, explaining its action on the ground that such businesses
"would have a severe impact upon surrounding businesses and
residences." 59
In April 1981 the City Council enacted an ordinance, based on the
Committee's recommendation, that restricted the location of adult the-
aters to a 520 acre area.6" At the time, no theaters were located in the
520 acre area and none of the theaters outside that area exhibited adult
films. In January 1982 Playtime Theaters acquired two movie theaters
in Renton, with the intention of exhibiting adult films at one of the
locations. Playtime then sued in federal district court to challenge the
constitutionality of the ordinance. 61
On January 11, 1983 the district court judge adopted a federal mag-
58. 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986).
59. Id. at 927.
60. Id. The ordinance originally prohibited adult theaters from locating within
1,000 feet of any residential zone or dwelling, any church, synagogue, or other religious
institution, or any park. It also prohibited an adult theater from locating within one
mile of any public or private school. The city later amended the ordinance to reduce the
locational restriction regarding schools from one mile to 1,000 feet.
61. Id.
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istrate's findings that: (1) the ordinance "for all practical purposes ex-
cludes adult theaters from the City;" (2) Renton had not established a
factual basis for the adoption of the ordinance; and (3) the motivation
behind the ordinance reflected "simple distaste for adult theaters be-
cause of the content of the films shown." The court granted Playtime a
preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the ordinance and Play-
time began to exhibit adult movies.62
62. Playtime Theaters, Inc. v. City of Renton, 748 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1984). In
the midst of this litigation, Renton passed an emergency ordinance amending its earlier
ordinance by changing certain locational restrictions, providing additional definitions,
and adding an elaborate statement of reasons for the enactment of the ordinances.
The City gave the following reasons in the amended ordinance:
1. Areas within close walking distance of single and multiple family dwellings
should be free of adult entertainment land uses.
2. Areas where children could be expected to walk, patronize or recreate should
be free of adult entertainment land uses.
3. Adult entertainment land uses should be located in areas of the City which
are not in close proximity to residential uses, churches, parks and other pub-
lic facilities, and schools.
4. The image of the City of Renton as a pleasant and attractive place to reside
will be adversely affected by the presence of adult entertainment land uses in
close proximity to residential land uses, churches, parks and other public fa-
cilities, and schools.
5. Regulation of adult entertainment land uses should be developed to prevent
deterioration and/or degradation of the vitality of the community before the
problem exists, rather than in response to an existing problem.
6. Commercial areas of the City patronized by young people and children
should be free of adult entertainment land uses.
7. The Renton School District opposes a location of adult entertainment land
uses within the perimeters of its policy regarding bussing of students, so that
students walking to school will not be subjected to confrontation with the
existence of adult entertainment land uses.
8. The Renton School District finds that location of adult entertainment land
uses in areas of the City which are in close proximity to schools, and commer-
cial areas patronized by students and young people, will have a detrimental
effect upon the quality of education which the School District is providing for
its students.
9. The Renton School District finds that education of its students will be nega-
tively affected by location of adult entertainment land uses in close proximity
to location of schools.
10. Adult entertainment land uses should be regulations [sic) by zoning to sepa-
rate it from other dissimilar uses just as any other land use should be sepa-
rated from uses with characteristics different from itself.
11. Residents of the City of Renton, and persons who are non-residents but use
the City of Renton for shopping and other commercial needs, will move from
the community or shop elsewhere if adult entertainment land uses are allowed
to locate in close proximity to residential uses, churches, parks and other
public facilities, and schools.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol32/iss1/4
ADULT BUSINESS REGULATION
In February 1983 the parties agreed to submit the case for hearing
on whether a permanent injunction should issue on the basis of the
record already developed. On February 17 the district court vacated
12. Location of adult entertainment land uses in proximity to residential uses,
churches, parks and other public facilities, and schools, may lead to increased
levels of criminal activities, including prostitution, rape, incest and assaults in
the vicinity of such adult entertainment land uses.
13. Merchants in the commercial area of the City are concerned about adverse
impacts upon the character and quality of the City in the event that adult
entertainment land uses are located within close proximity to residential uses,
churches, parks and other public facilities, and schools. Location of adult
entertainment land uses in close pxoximity to residential uses, churches,
parks and other public facilities, and schools, will reduce retail trade to com-
mercial uses in the vicinity, thus reducing property values and tax revenues to
the City. Such adverse affect [sic] on property values will cause the loss of
some commercial establishments followed by a blighting effect upon the com-
mercial districts within the City, leading to further deterioration of the com-
mercial quality of the City.
14. Experience in numerous other cities, including Seattle, Tacoma and Detroit,
Michigan, has shown that location of adult entertainment land uses degrade
the quality of the area of the City in which they are located and cause a
blighting effect upon the City. The skid row effect, which is evident in certain
parts of Seattle and other cities, will have a significantly larger affect [sic]
upon the City of Renton than other major cities due to the relative sizes of the
cities.
15. No evidence has been presented to show that location of adult entertainment
land uses within the City will improve the commercial viability of the
community.
16. Location of adult entertainment land uses within walking distance of
churches and other religious facilities will have an adverse effect upon the
ministry of such churches and will discourage attendance at such churches by
the proximity of adult entertainment land uses.
17. A reasonable regulation of the location of adult entertainment land uses will
provide for the protection of the image of the community and its property
values, and protect the residents of the community from the adverse effects of
such adult entertainment land uses, while providing to those who desire to
patronize adult entertainment land uses such an opportunity in areas within
the City which are appropriate for location of adult entertainment land uses.
18. The community will be an undesirable place to live if it it known on the basis
of its image as the location of adult entertainment land uses.
19. A stable atmosphere for the rearing of families cannot be achieved in close
proximity to adult entertainment land uses.
20. The initial location of adult entertainment land uses will lead to the location
of additional and similar uses within the same vicinity, thus multiplying the
adverse impact of the initial location of adult entertainment land uses upon
the residential, [sic] churches, parks and other public facilities, and schools,
and the impact upon the image and quality of the character of the
community.
Id. at 530-31 n.3. See supra note 60.
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the preliminary injunction and denied Playtime a permanent injunc-
tion, thus reinstating the ordinance. The court, departing from the
magistrate's findings, found that 520 acres were available for the loca-
tion of adult theaters and that the ordinance did not impermissibly re-
strict Playtime's first amendment rights. The court also found no
improper motive behind enactment of the ordinance and ruled that
Renton could rely on the experiences of other cities in its legislative
findings supporting the ordinance. Renton appealed the district court's
decision.63
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court.'
Although the court of appeals accepted the district court's finding that
520 acres remained outside the ordinance's locational restrictions, the
appellate court did not agree that the land was "available" for adult
theaters. Noting that a substantial part of the 520 acres was occupied
by a sewage treatment plant, a horse racing track, an industrial park,
warehouse and manufacturing facilities, an oil tank farm, and a fully
developed shopping center, the Ninth Circuit found that limiting adult
theaters to these areas was a substantial restriction on speech. Thus,
the Renton ordinance, although patterned after the Detroit ordinance
approved in Young, had a quite different effect because it restricted the
number of adult theaters. 5
The court of appeals examined the Renton ordinance under the four-
part test developed in United States v. O'Brien.6 6 Applying the test to
the challenged ordinance, the court found two problems: Renton had
not demonstrated a substantial governmental interest 67 and had not
63. 748 F.2d at 532.
64. Playtime Theaters, Inc. v. City of Renton, 748 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1984).
65. Id. at 534.
66. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). Under this test, a regulation is constitutional only "if
it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is to the furtherance of that interest." Id.
67. 748 F.2d at 536-37. Renton had presented a very thin record to support its
enactment of the ordinance. To uphold the substantiality of Renton's governmental
interest, the district court had to rely on Renton's rezitation of the experience of other
cites, particularly Detroit and Seattle. The Ninth Circuit found this reliance misplaced,
ruling that Renton had not studied the effects of adu t theaters and applied those find-
ings to the specific problems of Renton. In particular, the Detroit experience, involving
the problems raised by a concentration of adult uses, was irrelevant to Renton's stated
interest in isolating adult theaters from residential districts and certain other uses. The
court stopped short of ruling that Renton could not use the experiences of other cities as
part of its findings in support of the ordinance, but found that "in this case those exper-
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proved that the ordinance was unrelated to the suppression of speech. 68
The Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit in a decision in
which only Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented. Justice Rehn-
quist's majority opinion found this case essentially similar to Young
and found that it could be properly analyzed as a form of time, place,
and manner regulation.69 While the ordinance singled out adult thea-
ters for separate zoning treatment, Rehnquist argued that the ordi-
nance was aimed "not at the content of the films shown, but at the
secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community." 7 °
Thus, he found that "the Renton ordinance is completely consistent
with our definition of 'content-neutral' speech regulations as those that
'are justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech.' ,7 In reaching this conclusion, Rehnquist rejected the Ninth
Circuit's claim that a "motivating factor" in the zoning decision was
the restriction of plaintiffs' exercise of first amendment rights. 2
Justice Rehnquist's line of reasoning brought the case squarely
within the precedent created in Young. The test for such an ordinance,
according to Rehnquist, has two parts: (1) whether the ordinance
serves a substantial governmental interest and (2) whether it allows for
reasonable alternative means of communication.73 The major issue in
the first prong of this inquiry was whether Renton was justified in rely-
ing on the experiences of other cities in finding that adult theaters pose
a serious threat of urban deterioration. The Ninth Circuit had ruled
that because Renton enacted the ordinance without the benefit of stud-
ies specifically relating to its particular problems or needs, the city's
iences simply are not sufficient to sustain Renton's burden of showing a significant gov-
ernmental interest." Id.
68. Id. at 537-38. Renton also had not proved that its zoning decision was "moti-
vated by a desire to further a compelling governmental interest unrelated to the suppres-
sion of free expression." The Ninth Circuit noted that both the federal magistrate and
the district court recognized that many of the reasons Renton offered for its ordinance
"were no more than expressions of dislike for the subject matter." On these facts, the
Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine whether Renton
could prove that suppression of speech was not a motivating factor in its adoption of the
ordinance.
69. 106 S. Ct. at 928.
70. Id. at 929 (emphasis in original).
71. Id.
72. See supra note 68. Justice Rehnquist rejected this reasoning, reading O'Brien as
precluding invalidation of "an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of alleged
illicit legislative motive .. " See infra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
73. 106 S. Ct. at 930.
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justifications for the ordinance were "conclusory and speculative."'74
The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's approach as impos-
ing an unnecessarily rigid burden of proof. Noting that Renton had
considered the detailed findings regarding the effects of adult theaters
in neighboring Seattle, the majority held that Renton was entitled to
rely on the experiences of Seattle and other cities.75 The majority also
provided guidance for other municipalities that seek to rely on the ex-
perience of other cities: "The First Amendment does not require a
city, before enacting such an ordinance, to conduct new studies or pro-
duce evidence independent of that already generated by other cities, so
long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to
be relevant to the problem that the city addresses."76
After dismissing claims that the Renton ordinance was flawed be-
cause it concentrated the location of theaters rather than dispersing
them like the Detroit ordinance,77 and was underinclusive because it
regulated only adult theaters and not the other kinds of adult busi-
nesses that are likely to produce secondary effects,78 the majority ad-
dressed the second prong of its test: whether the Renton ordinance
allowed for reasonable alternative avenues of communication. There
was no question that the ordinance permitted adult theaters to locate
within a 520 acre portion of the city. A dispute, however, existed over
whether "commercially viable" sites were available for adult theaters
within this restricted area. The Ninth Circuit found that none existed
and held that the Renton ordinance would result in a substantial re-
striction on speech.79
The majority rejected the Ninth Circuit's conclusion, relying instead
74. 748 F.2d at 537.
75. 106 S. Ct. at 931. Renton had relied extensively on the "detailed findings" of
Seattle's study on the effects of adult movie theaters summarized in the Washington
Supreme Court's opinion in Northend Cinema, Inc. v. Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 709, 585
P.2d 1153 (1978).
76. 106 S. Ct. at 931.
77. The majority supported its position by quoting from the plurality opinion in
Young: "It is not our function to appraise the wisdom of [the city's] decision to require
adult theaters to be separated rather than concentrated in the same areas.... [T]he city
must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly
serious problems." 427 U.S. at 71. For examples of other "concentration" ordinances,
see F. STROM, ZONING CONTROL OF SEX BUSINESSES (1977).
78. The majority upheld the Renton ordinance on this point because no other adult
business was located in, or was contemplating moving into, the city at the time the
ordinance was enacted.
79. 748 F.2d at 534.
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on the district court's finding that the 520 acres of land consisted of
"[a]mple, accessible real estate," including "acreage in all stages of de-
velopment from raw land to developed, industrial, warehouse, office,
and shopping space that is criss-crossed by freeways, highways, and
roads."8 Because land and buildings were ample and accessible, the
majority argued that Renton had not effectively denied the adult thea-
ter operators a reasonable opportunity to open and operate an adult
theater within the city.81
Adult theater operators, the majority said, "must fend for them-
selves in the real estate market, on an equal footing with other prospec-
tive purchasers and lessees. . . . [W]e have never suggested that the
First Amendment compels the Government to ensure that adult thea-
ters, or any other kinds of speech-related businesses for that matter,
will be able to obtain sites at bargain prices."82 The majority con-
cluded that the Renton ordinance represented a valid governmental re-
sponse to the serious problems created by adult theaters and had not
used "the power to zone as a pretext for suppressing expression.",
83
Justice Brennan's dissent, joined by Justice Marshall, labeled the ma-
jority's analysis "misguided." Justice Brennan attacked the argument
that the Renton ordinance was aimed at the secondary effects of the
adult theaters and not at the content of the films shown there. For
Brennan, the fact that the ordinance imposed "special restrictions on
certain kinds of speech on the basis of content" belied Renton's claim
that the ordinance was not designed to suppress the content of adult
movies.84 Not only did the ordinance discriminate on its face against
adult theaters but, Brennan claimed, the circumstances surrounding
the adoption and amendment of the ordinance strongly suggested that
the ordinance was designed to suppress expression. Justice Brennan
asserted that the findings supporting the ordinance were adopted only
after the commencement of the lawsuit; the findings were based pri-
marily on the experiences of other cities; the City Council conducted
no studies and heard no expert testimony on how the community
would be affected by the presence of an adult movie theater; and a
number of these findings did not relate to legitimate land use concerns
and were no more than expressions of dislike for the subject matter




84. Id. at 934.
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depicted at adult theaters.8 5
Based on these circumstances, Justice Brennan concluded that the
Renton ordinance was designed to suppress expression and thus should
not be analyzed as a content-neutral time, place, and manner restric-
tion.86 Viewed as a content-based restriction on speech, the ordinance
is constitutional, he argued, "only if the [city] can show that [it] is a
precisely drawn means of serving a compelling [governmental] inter-
est.",87 Applying this standard to the facts of this case, Brennan found
the ordinance unconstitutional because Renton had not shown that lo-
cating adult theaters near its churches, schools, and homes would nec-
essarily result in undesirable "secondary effects," or that it could not
effectively address these problems by less intrusive restrictions."8
Justice Brennan also found the ordinance unconstitutional when an-
alyzed as a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction. Apply-
ing the majority's two-prong test, Brennan found that the record
justifying the city's asserted interest was insufficient to support that
interest 89 and that the ordinance did not provide for reasonable alter-
native avenues of communication. 90 With respect to the last point, he
found fault with the majority's argument that the ordinance did noth-
ing more than require adult theater operators to participate in the real
estate market like anyone else, pointing out that adult theater operators
were not being treated the same as others because the ordinance re-
85. Id. at 934-36. Brennan cited two findings of the City Council as examples of
"expressions of dislike for the subject matter:"
Location of adult entertainment land uses on the main commercial thorough-
fares of the City gives an impression of legitimacy to, and causes a loss of sensitiv-
ity to the adverse effect of pornography upon children, established family relations,
respect for the marital relationship and for the sanctity of marriage relations of
others, and the concept of non-aggressive, consensual sexual relations....
Location of adult land uses in close proximity to residential uses, churches,
parks, and other public facilities, and schools, will cause a degradation of the com-
munity standard of morality. Pornographic material has a degrading effect upon
the relationship between spouses.
106 S. Ct. at 935 n.3.
86. 106 S. Ct. at 934-36.
87. Id. at 937 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530, 540 (1979)).
88. Id.
89. Id. Brennan contrasted the substantial factual record in Young with the slim
record here: "the Renton Council was aware only that some residents had complained
about adult movie theaters, and that other localities had adopted special zoning restric-
tions for such establishments." Id.
90. Id. at 938.
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quired them to conduct business under severe restrictions not imposed
on others. In short, while other businesses seeking to locate in the 520
acre area could likely go elsewhere if economics demanded, the adult
theater operators could not.9 1
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RENTON DECISION
Renton is an important decision for a number of reasons. Primarily,
it shows that a clear majority of the Supreme Court now accept Justice
Stevens' argument in Young that zoning ordinances may single out
adult businesses for regulatory treatment different from that accorded
other types of businesses. Justice Rehnquist's opinion found that the
Renton ordinance was a valid content-neutral time, place, and manner
restriction because the ordinance was aimed "not at the content of the
films shown, but at the secondary effects of such theaters on the sur-
rounding community."9 2 By placing adult business zoning squarely in
the category of time, place, and manner regulation, the majority directs
courts to apply the relatively lenient Renton standard of review to
judge the validity of such ordinances, rather than the more demanding
O'Brien test called for in Powell's concurring opinion in Young. This
dichotomy is of critical importance because lower courts have, in the
past, usually required that adult business zoning pass muster under
both the Stevens and Powell tests.93
The majority opinion also makes clear that both dispersion and con-
centration are constitutionally valid strategies for addressing the
problems of adult businesses. Because Young dealt only with a disper-
sion ordinance, Renton is the first Supreme Court case upholding the
concentration of adult businesses, a technique used in Boston and Seat-
tle, among other cities. Local governments may now safety adopt
either a concentration or dispersion approach to adult businesses.
To explore the likely effects of the Renton decision in more detail, it
will be helpful to refer again to the four "rules" that appeared to guide
the courts in the years after the Young decision. The Renton case ad-
dresses two of these directly: the effect of zoning on the number of
adult businesses and the development of findings of fact to support the
ordinance.
Young required that the market for adult entertainment remain "es-
91. Id.
92. Id. at 929.
93. See supra note 35.
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sentially unrestrained" after the enactment of adult business zoning.94
The Detroit ordinance passed this test because the Court found that
the dispersion scheme, while prohibiting adult businesses from certain
locations, would not have the effect of diminishing the number of adult
businesses that could operate in the city. When other cities attempted
to use the dispersion technique to severely restrict or effectively ban
adult businesses, however, the lower courts did not hesitate to invali-
date the offending ordinances.95
The real controversy on this issue involves ordinances like Renton's
that have the effect of restricting adult businesses to sites arguably un-
suited to such uses. 96 Justice Rehnquist's test for judging such an ordi-
nance is whether the enactment effectively denies adult businesses a
reasonable opportunity to open and operate an adult theater. In Ren-
ton's case, he found that the ordinance "easily" met this requirement,
dismissing the concerns of the Ninth Circuit by arguing that the ordi-
nance did nothing more than require that adult businesses "must fend
for themselves in the real estate market, on an equal footing with other
prospective purchasers and lessees .... 7 Justice Brennan disagreed,
arguing that the ordinance itself precluded adult businesses from enter-
ing the real estate market on an "equal footing" with other businesses
because only adult businesses were subject to the severe restrictions
imposed by the ordinance.98
94. 427 U.S. at 62. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
95. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
96. In Renton the suitability of the 520 acres for adult businesses was a significant
factual issue. The federal magistrate found that the areas to which the ordinance re-
stricted theaters were "entirely unsuited to movie theater use." 748 F.2d at 532. The
district court approved these findings when it issued its preliminary injunction against
the ordinance in January 1983, but in February it refused Playtime's request for a per-
manent injunction, finding that the ordinance did not substantially restrict first amend-
ment interests. The district court offered no explanation for this variance between its
two sets of findings. 748 F.2d at 532 n.7.
The Ninth Circuit, while agreeing that 520 acres were available for adult theaters,
disagreed that the land was "available" for that use because of the nature of the existing
uses, which included: (1) a sewage treatment plant; (2) a racetrack; (3) a business park
suitable only for industry; (4) a warehouse and manufacturing facilities; (5) an oil tank
farm; and (6) a fully-developed shopping center. 748 F.2d at 534. In its brief to the
Supreme Court, Playtime argued that it could not locate its theater on sites already
occupied by existing businesses, that "practically none" of the undeveloped land was
currently for sale or lease, and that in general no "commercially viable" adult theater
locations existed in the areas left open by the ordinance. 106 S. Ct. at 932.
97. 106 S. Ct. at 932.
98. Id. at 938.
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Justice Rehnquist's "reasonable opportunity" test does not provide
lower courts with much guidance to judge the validity of ordinances
with speculative impact on adult businesses. An ordinance that leaves
a "myriad" of sites available for adult uses is certainly valid.99 An
ordinance that "greatly restricts" or bans adult businesses altogether is
certainly invalid." ° ° But how does a court apply the "reasonable op-
portunity" test when, as in Renton, the ordinance bans use of existing
theaters and new theaters face significant locational restrictions? Two
lower courts, in addition to the Ninth Circuit in Renton, have ad-
dressed this question.
In Basiardanes v. City of Galveston 101 the Fifth Circuit overturned
an adult business ordinance because the locational restrictions were so
severe that adult businesses could operate only under "oppressive"
conditions. The court found that adult businesses were banned in 85 to
90 percent of the city, while the remaining areas in which adult busi-
nesses could locate were unsuited for such uses.1 0 2 Based on these find-
ings, the court concluded that the areas were available for adult
businesses only in theory and, because the ordinance's locational re-
strictions could readily have the effect of reducing the number of adult
businesses, the ordinance was an invalid restriction on activities pro-
tected by the first amendment.'0 3
Basiardanes is instructive because the district court had held that the
ordinance could be sustained as long as sites were available for adult
businesses, regardless of the relative attractiveness of those sites to
adult business operators. For the district court, the restrictions on
adult business locations were nothing more than the "reasonable eco-
nomic burden that befalls some activity in every land-use program.' 4
99. See Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 71-72 n.35 (1976).
100. See, e.g., Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 698 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1983) (ordi-
nance would have the effect of diminishing the number of adult businesses by two-
thirds); Keego Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1981) (ordi-
nance had effect of totally banning adult theaters).
101. 682 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1982).
102. 682 F.2d at 1214. The Galveston ordinance permitted adult businesses only in
industrial zones that were distant from other shopping and entertainment areas and that
contained only warehouses, shipyards, undeveloped areas, and swamps. These areas
had few roads and were "poorly lit, barren of structures suitable for showing films, and
perhaps unsafe." Id.
103. Because the court of appeals found that the ordinance drastically impaired
access to adult films in Galveston, it tested the ordinance under the two-part Schad test.
See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
104. Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 514 F. Supp. 975, 982 (S.D. Tex. 1981). The
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The Fifth Circuit argued that while a zoning ordinance may normally
impose an economic burden on business, "when a claim of suppression
of speech is raised, an exclusive focus on economic impact is im-
proper."10 5 Because the appellate court felt the ordinance greatly re-
stricted access to adult businesses in Galveston, the ordinance could
not be viewed as merely placing an economic burden on adult
businesses.
International Food and Beverage Systems v. City of Fort Lauder-
dale 106 presented a similar case. Fort Lauderdale's adult business ordi-
nance left no more than twenty-two sites available for adult businesses.
Of these, the majority were located in areas that, in the view of the
court, were "patently unsuitable," leaving a total of twelve sites avail-
able for adult businesses. The court, in language quite similar to that
used later by Justice Rehnquist, stated that while the Constitution does
not grant one the right to be a business success, the city has a duty "to
make reasonably available suitably zoned property ... [where adult
businesses] have a reasonable chance to operate." 107 Acknowledging
that determination of how many sites are needed to satisfy the "reason-
ably available" standard is difficult, the court, relying on Young, found
that twelve sites would be insufficient. 108
The facts in Renton are quite similar to those in Basiardanes and
more egregious than those in International Food. In all three cases,
factors such as incompatible neighboring uses, lack of existing suitable
structures, and distance from established retail and commercial dis-
district court looked to Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Young to support its
position:
The constraints of the ordinance with respect to location may indeed create eco-
nomic loss for some who are engaged in this business. But in this respect they are
affected no differently from any other commercial enterprise that suffers economic
detriment as a result of land-use regulation. The cases are legion that sustained
zoning against claims of serious economic damage....
The inquiry for First Amendment purposes is not concerned with economic im-
pact; rather it looks only to the effect of this ordinance upon freedom of
expression....
Id. at n.15 (quoting Young, 427 U.S. at 78 (Powell, J., concurring)).
105. 682 F.2d at 1214.
106. 614 F. Supp. 1517 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
107. Id. at 1521.
108. Id. at 1521-22. The court quoted the observation in Young that there were
"myriad locations in the City of Detroit" available for adult businesses, and observed
that "[a] dozen or so potential sites in the City of Fort Lauderdale does not a 'myriad'
make." Id. at 1522.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol32/iss1/4
ADULT BUSINESS REGULATION
tricts led the lower courts to the conclusion that sites for adult busi-
nesses would not be "reasonably" available. In light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Renton, however, such factors are now irrelevant.
As long as the restricted area contains sufficient vacant or developed
land, is accessible by road, and is eligible for utility services, then a
community has created a "reasonable opportunity" for the operation of
adult businesses. While courts obviously enjoy a great deal of leeway
in deciding individual cases, the tone of the opinion calls for less strin-
gent judicial review of the probable effect of restrictions on adult
businesses.
At a minimum, Renton places the burden of proof on those challeng-
ing an adult business ordinance to prove that its locational restrictions
preclude a "reasonable opportunity" to operate in that community. If
a party challenging an ordinance can make a strong, uncontradicted
factual showing that the restrictions severely restrict or effectively pro-
hibit adult businesses from operating, the Renton decision clearly em-
powers a court to invalidate the ordinance. What is troubling about
the decision, however, is that it may encourage cities to play a game of
"chicken" with the courts to see how far adult businesses may be re-
stricted before a court objects. The goal here, unfortunately, is to use
zoning impermissibly as a technique for eliminating adult businesses,
and because reasonableness is such an elusive term, the Renton deci-
sion has made that easier.
Young also sought to guard against ordinances motivated by a dis-
taste for constitutionally protected forms of expression by requiring
that communities demonstrate the adverse effects on neighborhoods as-
sociated with adult businesses and narrowly tailor their restrictions to
further the specific governmental interests endangered by the presence
of such businesses. In a number of subsequent cases, courts struck
down ordinances in part because the city had not developed an ade-
quate factual record or had relied on the findings of other communities
rather than conducting its own studies.' 9
In Renton the city relied on the factual findings and experience of
Seattle and Detroit rather than making any findings of its own. The
Ninth Circuit found that because Renton enacted the ordinance with-
109. See, e.g., Ebel v. City of Corona, 698 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1983); Kuzinich v.
County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1982); Basiardanes v. City of Galveston,
682 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1982); Fantasy Book Shop, Inc. v. City of Boston, 652 F.2d
1115 (1st Cir. 1981); Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 667 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1981)
(en banc); Keego Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1981).
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out the benefit of studies specifically relating to the particular problems
or needs of Renton, the city's justifications for the ordinance were
"conclusory and speculative."11  The Supreme Court majority re-
jected this argument, claiming that it imposed an unnecessarily rigid
burden of proof on the city, and held that Renton was justified in rely-
ing on the experience of other cities. To guide courts in the future on
this issue, the majority stated: "The First Amendment does not re-
quire a city, before enacting such an ordinance, to conduct new studies
or produce evidence independent of that already generated by other
cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably
believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses."11'
This "reasonable belief" standard for adopting another city's experi-
ence with adult businesses suffers from the same shortcomings as the
"reasonable opportunity" standard discussed previously. The Renton
majority opinion provides only minimal guidance in how to administer
the standard. Justice Rehnquist noted that Seattle had shared Ren-
ton's concern with preventing the secondary effects caused by the pres-
ence of even one adult theater in a given neighborhood. Further,
Rehnquist recognized that Renton had relied heavily on the "detailed
findings" developed by Seattle, and that it was irrelevant that Renton
ultimately chose a different method of adult theater zoning than
Seattle's. ' 12
Justice Rehnquist's opinion suggests that cities may safely rely on
the experience of other communities if the problems addressed in the
two cities are similar and there are "detailed findings" about the effects
of adult businesses." 3 Courts will probably also require a city relying
on another community's experience to offer some reasonable justifica-
tion for doing so. This does not mean, however, that a city is totally
free to forego its own fact-finding. For example, a court would have
little trouble striking down an ordinance that justified its regulation of
a single adult bookstore by reliance on Detroit's experience with the
negative effects of a concentration of adult businesses.114
110. 748 F.2d at 537.
111. 106S.Ct.at931.
112. Id. at 930-31.
113. See, e.g., International Food & Beverage Sys. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 614
F. Supp. 1517 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (perpetuating the legal fiction that a city must first estab-
lish objective evidence in support of a legitimate reason for enacting a zoning regulation
ignores the basic truth that adult entertainment causes similar problems in municipali-
ties of similar composition and character).
114. See, e.g., Krueger v. City of Pensacola, 759 F.2d 851 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (govern-
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Taken together, the two "reasonableness" standards for judging
adult business ordinances would seem to make it simple for many com-
munities to make the operation of adult businesses difficult, if not im-
possible, despite the fact that they are protected by the first
amendment. Young granted communities the right to prevent neigh-
borhood blight caused by a concentration of adult businesses if they
could show the problem existed in their community and if the restric-
tions they imposed did not lessen access to this form of protected
speech. Renton now effectively grants communities the power to ban
the use of any existing theater for the exhibition of adult movies with-
out any justification based on the conditions in that community and
without any assurance that a new location would be commercially via-
ble. What is particularly disturbing about this departure from Young is
the Court's failure to acknowledge strong evidence from lower court
cases that many adult business ordinances are motivated by either a
distaste for the content of the expression associated with adult busi-
nesses or an impermissible intent to ban or severely restrict the opera-
tion of adult businesses.1"'
Following the Supreme Court's approval of adult business zoning in
Young, some communities sought to restrict the number of adult uses
or ban them entirely simply by extending the locational restrictions
approved in Young until few, if any, sites were left for adult busi-
nesses. 16 Another simple method for restricting adult businesses was
to make existing adult uses subject to the ordinance rather than limit-
ing the zoning restrictions to future uses as in Young. 117 Other com-
ment may not merely mimic another ordinance that has been found constitutional in
another context, but must also show that the articulated concern had more than merely
speculative factual grounds and that it was actually a motivating factor in the passage of
the legislation).
115. See infra notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., CLR Corp. v. Henline, 702 F.2d 637 (6th Cir. 1983) (ordinance had
effect of limiting adult business sites to four locations concentrated on a single street at
one edge of a city of twenty-five square miles); Keego Harbor Co. v. City of Keego
Harborn, 657 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1981) (restriction barring an adult motion picture thea-
ter within 500 feet of bar or other regulated use had the effect of banning adult theaters
in resort community of 300 acres that contained twenty bars); Bayside Enter. v. Carson,
450 F. Supp. 696 (M.D. Fla. 1978); E & B Enterprises v. City of University Park, 449 F.
Supp. 695 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (locational restrictions had effect of barring adult theaters
when only two sites were unrestricted, one of which was owned by the city and the
other already occupied).
117. See, e.g., Ebel v. City of Corona, 698 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1983); Alexander v.
City of Minneapolis, 698 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1983); Basiardanes v. City of Galveston,
514 F. Supp. 975 (S.D. Tex. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 682 F.2d
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munities were able to place severe restrictions on the operation of adult
businesses by adding to their adult zoning ordinances restrictive licens-
ing provisions' or special permit procedures119 that gave city officials
nearly unbridled discretion to permit or deny adult businesses the right
to open.
In light of the many instances in which ordinances had the effect of
diminishing access to adult businesses, it is not surprising that a
number of cases have expressly called into question the motivation or
intent behind these enactments.1 20  Courts have found an improper
motive or intent in the following situations: when zoning appeared to
be merely a subterfuge for eradication of adult businesses,1 21 when jus-
1203 (5th Cir. 1982); Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson, 511 F. Supp. 1207 (N.D. Ga.
1981); Ellwest Stereo Theaters, Inc. v. Byrd, 472 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
118. See, e.g., Wendling v. City of Duluth, 495 F. Supp. 1380 (D. Minn. 1980)
(imposition of $500 annual fee on adult businesses is an unlawful prior restraint, and
provisions of general licensing requirements as applied to adult bookstores were uncon-
stitutional for lack of necessary procedural safeguards); Genusa v. City of Peoria, 475 F.
Supp. 1199 (C.D. Ill. 1979) (requirement that police conduct a special investigation of
applicants for adult business licensing when other types of bookstores would not be
inspected was unconstitutional), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and vacated in part, 619
F.2d 1203 (7th Cir. 1980); Bayside Enter. v. Carson, 470 F. Supp. 1140 (M.D. Fla.
1979) (ordinance that authorized denial, suspension, or revocation of license based upon
commission or conviction of specified criminal act was unconstitutional); Wortham v.
City of Tucson, 624 P.2d 334 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (licensing ordinance impinging on
first amendment rights that gives the licensing authority broad discretion to refuse a
license is unconstitutional prior restraint of such rights); but see Chulchian v. City of
Indianapolis, 633 F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1980) (general business licensing ordinance valid as
applied to an adult business operated in such a way that it was a public nuisance).
119. See, e.g., 15192 Thirteen Mile Rd. v. City of Warren, 593 F. Supp. 147 (E.D.
Mich. 1984) (requirement of special use permit was unconstitutional because it gave an
improper degree of discretion to local officials); County of Cook v. World Wide News
Agency, 98 Ill. App. 3d 1094, 424 N.E.2d 1173 (1981) (county officials given overbroad
discretion to deny special permits).
120. See Ebel v. City of Corona, 767 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1985); Krueger v. City of
Pensacola, 759 F.2d 851 (1 1th Cir. 1985); Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F.2d
1203 (5th Cir. 1984); Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1985);
Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 667 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc); Keego
Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1981); International Food &
Beverage Sys. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 614 F. Supp. 1517 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Purple
Onion, Inc. v. Jackson, 511 F. Supp. 1207 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
121. Purple Onion, 511 F. Supp. at 1210. In Purple Onion the minutes of the Zon-
ing Review Board showed an improper purpose of helping citizens disgusted with adult
businesses to "zone them out of business," and an assistant city attorney indicated that
the proposed ordinance was the "'strongest vehicle towards elimination' of adult busi-
nesses and that the City was 'hoping for complete eradication' of adult businesses." Id.
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tifications for zoning appeared only after the ordinance was adopted, 122
when the justifications offered for the ordinance were not supported by
the evidence, 12 3 or when the ordinance was enacted to prevent an adult
business from ever opening its doors.124
According to Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Renton, such evidence
of improper motive should have only a limited role in judging the va-
lidity of adult business ordinances. As long as the "predominate" in-
tent is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, allegations of an
illicit motive will not invalidate an ordinance.125 Unfortunately, in too
many cases, cities have proved adept at providing a record replete with
proper motivations for zoning that results in a significant restriction on
protected speech.' 2 6 The better rule would be to examine the evidence
carefully to determine the extent to which an impermissible intent to
restrict access to adult entertainment motivated passage of a given
ordinance.
OTHER ISSUES
The Renton case left undisturbed the two remaining rules that could
be derived from Young and subsequent cases. First, courts have not
hesitated to strike down ordinances that were vague or overbroad.
Adult business ordinances must show great precision in their language,
particularly in the text of definitions and standards for determining
what is and what is not regulated. Courts will invalidate ordinances
that leave the subjects of regulation unclear or that use definitions so
broad that uses other than adult businesses come within the
regulation.
27
Renton also was silent on the issue of ordinances that create poten-
122. See Playtime Theatres v. City of Renton, 748 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1984); Keego
Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1981).
123. See, e.g., Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1982). In
Basiardanes the Fifth Circuit found that Galveston had enacted its ordinance for the
sole purpose of removing an adult theater from the immediate vicinity of a newly-reno-
vated opera house because of a fear that opera patrons would find the adult theater
offensive.
124. See, e.g., International Food & Beverage Sys. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 614
F. Supp. 1517 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
125. 106 S. Ct. at 929.
126. In International Food, for example, the court found that evidence of a proper
motive was only a "pretext" for a prior restraint of adult entertainment. 614 F. Supp. at
1520.
127. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
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tial unconstitutional prior restraints on freedom of expression because
they grant government officials discretionary powers to determine
whether an adult business will be permitted to operate. Typically, such
ordinances use special permits or business licensing requirements that
allow officials to grant or deny an adult business permission to open.
The courts have generally been hostile to such provisions. In County of
Cook v. World Wide News Agency,' 28 for example, an amendment to
the Cook County zoning ordinance categorized adult businesses as spe-
cial uses that required the issuance of a special use permit. The court
struck down the ordinance as a prior restraint on freedom of expres-
sion, noting that the county board had unbridled discretion to grant or
deny the permit.
Although not an issue in the Renton case, amortization provisions
warrant discussion because the Renton decision may affect the courts'
treatment of such provisions. Many cities that have enacted adult busi-
ness ordinances have made the restrictions prospective only, allowing
existing businesses to continue to operate as non-conforming uses. 129
No constitutional bar exists, however, to requiring such non-con-
forming uses to cease operation within a reasonable time limit. The
general rule for determining the reasonableness of such an amortiza-
tion period is whether the probable benefit to the community from
closing the business outweighs the hardship incurred by the operator
from such a closing. Thus, for example, in Northend Cinema, Inc. v.
City of Seattle 13o the Supreme Court of Washington upheld a Seattle
adult business zoning ordinance that had the effect of requiring the
concentration of adult uses and included a provision terminating any
non-conforming adult business within ninety days. The court found
the ninety day amortization period reasonable as applied to a number
of adult theaters because none of the theaters were bound by a lease to
exhibit adult films nor were the theaters bound to remain at their ex-
isting locations. Accordingly, the court concluded that the public ben-
efit from the termination of these uses outweighed the merely
speculative harm asserted by the theater operators. Other courts have
upheld amortization provisions of varying lengths.13 '
128. 98 Il. App. 3d 1094, 424 N.E.2d 1173 (1981).
129. See, e.g., Texas Nat'l Theatres, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 97 N.M. 282, 639
P.2d 569 (1982) (general rule is that non-conforming uses in existence at the time of
amendment of the zoning ordinance may be continued).
130. 90 Wash. 2d 709, 585 P.2d 1153 (1978).
131. See, e.g., Hurt Bookstores, Inc. v. Edmisten, 612 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1979) (six
month period); Castner v. City of Oakland, 129 Cal. App. 3d 94, 180 Cal. Rptr. 682
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In cases in which amortization provisions have been combined with
severe locational restrictions on adult businesses, however, courts have
struck down ordinances. In Alexander v. City of Minneapolis,132 for
example, the court invalidated an ordinance that provided a three
month amortization period for adult businesses. The court found that
over thirty adult businesses would have to be terminated by the end of
the amortization period, but because of the severe locational restric-
tions in the ordinance, only a limited number of available sites were left
in the city where these businesses could relocate. On these facts, the
court found that the ordinance was an excessive restriction on constitu-
tionally protected speech and invalidated it. 1
33
These cases suggest that courts may treat ordinances with locational
restrictions like those in the Renton case more harshly if they contain
amortization provisions rather than allowing non-conforming uses to
remain in operation. Courts may find it appropriate to restrict future
adult businesses to areas where they have a "reasonable opportunity"
to operate, but may well draw the line if, in addition, existing busi-
nesses are required to terminate their operation at existing sites. The
greater the number of existing businesses affected by the ordinance, the
more likely that the ordinance will be invalidated, despite the Supreme
Court's decision in Renton.
CONCLUSION
The majority opinion in Renton directs courts to give more deference
to the "reasonable" decisions of government officials when they place
restrictions on adult businesses. Cities now have no need to conduct
their own studies of the effects of adult businesses in their community,
but may rely on the experiences of other cities that are reasonably re-
lated to their own conditions. Cities may also preclude adult busi-
nesses, particularly adult theaters, from using existing facilities and
restrict their location to outlying areas, as long as the restricted area is
reasonably capable of being developed for adult business use. Renton,
therefore, appears to signal a major change in the courts' treatment of
adult business ordinances. We should now expect to see far less judi-
cial hostility towards ordinances that place significant restrictions on
(1982) (one year amortization period for non-conforming uses that fail to obtain a con-
ditional use permit, with additional one year grace period for adult businesses that
demonstrate economic hardship).
132. 698 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1983).
133. See also supra notes 39-46 for discussion of the Purple Onion case.
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such businesses. The courts, however, remain free to strike down ordi-
nances that are vague, that create a system of prior restraints on
speech, or that restrict adult businesses to such an extent that this form
of expression is effectively banned.
Unfortunately, the Court's decision ignores the significant number of
lower court cases in which zoning has been used to restrict or ban ac-
cess to adult businesses rather than to regulate their location. Under
the new "reasonableness" standards, it will be even more difficult for
courts to strike down ordinances that impermissibly seek to regulate
the content of speech because of a dislike for what is being expressed.
Hopefully, the lower courts will find sufficient leeway within the Ren-
ton opinion to continue to invalidate ordinances that show clear evi-
dence of improper motivation or that unduly restrict access to adult
entertainment.
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